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I. INTRODUCTION
According to Rule 809.32 of the Wisconsin Rules of Appellate
Procedure, when an appointed appellate attorney seeks to withdraw
from an appeal that he believes is frivolous, he must file a brief with
the court of appeals presenting anything in the record that arguably
might support the appeal.' In addition, the rule mandates that the
1. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 809.32(1) (West 1988). The text of Rule 809.32 provides in
pertinent part: -
(1) If an [appointed attorney] . . . is of the opinion that further appellate
proceedings on behalf of the defendant would be frivolous and without any
arguable merit within the meaning of Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967),
the attorney shall file with the court of appeals 3 copies of a brief in which is
stated anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal and a
discussion of why the issue lacks merit. The attorney shall serve a copy of the
brief on the defendant and shall file a statement in the court of appeals that
service has been made upon the defendant. The defendant may file a response to
the brief within 30 days of service.
(2) The attorney also shall file in the trial court a notice of appeal of the
judgment of conviction and of any order denying a postconviction motion. The
clerk of the trial court shall transmit the record in the case to the court .... The
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required brief discuss why the appeal lacks merit.2 In fact, the rule
appears to incorporate the plain language of the United States
Supreme Court's holding in Anders v. California,3 which requires that
an appointed appellate attorney file a brief presenting anything in the
record that arguably might support the appeal, in order to withdraw
from an appeal that he deems frivolous.4 The rule refers to such a
brief as a No-Merit Brief.5 Unlike the situation envisioned by the
Wisconsin Rule, however, the appointed attorney in Anders did not
discuss the reasons why Anders' appeal lacked merit.6
Requiring or even permitting an appointed appellate attorney to
discuss the reasons why his client's appeal lacks merit raises the ques-
tion whether such discussion violates the sixth and fourteenth amend-
ment rightl of indigent defendants to receive the effective assistance of
counsel. The Supreme Court addressed this question in McCoy v.
Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, District 1.7
In McCoy, the defendant, an indigent, was convicted of one
count of second degree sexual assault and one count of abduction.'
The trial court sentenced the defendant to six years of incarceration
for each count, with the terms to be served consecutively.9 On the
first appeal as a matter of right from this conviction, ° a Wisconsin
assistant public defender served as the defendant's appointed appel-
no merit brief and notice of appeal must be filed within 180 days of the service
upon the defendant of the transcript ....
(3) In the event the court of appeals finds that further appellate proceedings
would be frivolous and without any arguable merit, the court of appeals shall
affirm the judgment of conviction and the denial of any postconviction motion
and relieve the attorney of further responsibility in the case. The attorney shall
advise the defendant of the right to file a petition for review to the supreme court
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 809.32(l)-(3).
2. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 809.32(1).
3. 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
4. Id. at 744.
5. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 809.32(2) (West 1988).
6. For a discussion of the facts and the opinion of the Supreme Court in Anders v.
California, see infra notes 53-67 and accompanying text.
7. 108 S. Ct. 1895 (1988).
8. See Brief of Defendant-Appellant in the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, District 1, Joint
Appendix at J.A. 17-18, McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, District 1, 108 S. Ct. 1895
(1988) (No. 87-5002) [hereinafter No-Merit Brief] (containing an account of the McCoy trial
proceedings).
9. Id. at J.A. 18.
10. See id. at J.A. 17-18. Under the laws of the state of Wisconsin, a person convicted of a
crime is guaranteed an appeal as a matter of right. See Wis. CONST. art. I, § 21, cl. 1 (1848,
amended 1977) ("Writs of error shall never be prohibited, and shall be issued by such courts as
the legislature designates by law."). The Wisconsin rule granting appeals to the court of
appeals as a matter of right provides in pertinent part: "(1) Appeals as of Right. A final
judgment or a final order of a circuit court may be appealed as a matter of right to the court of
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late counsel."1 After researching the case for purposes of the appeal,
the defendant's counsel concluded that the appeal was frivolous and
without any arguable merit. 2 As a result, he advised the defendant
that his options were to voluntarily dismiss the appeal, to proceed pro
se, or to have counsel file a No-Merit Brief'3-a brief filed in the
appellate court "in which is stated anything in the record that might
arguably support the appeal and a discussion of why the issue lacks
merit."' 4 Although the defendant chose to have counsel file a No-
Merit Brief,'5 the defendant's counsel did not file the brief at that
time. '
6
Instead, the defendant's counsel filed a motion in the Wisconsin
Court of Appeals, District I, to determine whether Rule 809.32(1)
was constitutional'" and to clarify counsel's role on appeal.' 8 The
appellate court denied the motion.19 It reasoned that the subject of
the motion lacked a justiciable controversy regarding the constitution-
ality of Wisconsin's No-Merit Brief requirement because the defend-
ant's counsel had not filed a No-Merit Brief.2' In response, the
defendant's counsel prepared and filed a No-Merit Brief in the same
appellate court,2' setting forth four arguments in support of his cli-
ent's appeal2 2 and presenting facts relevant to the appeal.23 The
appeals unless otherwise expressly provided by law." Wis. STAT. ANN. § 808.03(1) (West
1988).
11. See No-Merit Brief, supra note 8, at J.A. 11.
12. Brief for the Appellant at 7, McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, District 1, 108
S. Ct. 1895 (1988) (No. 87-5002) [hereinafter Brief for the Appellant].
13. Id.
14. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 809.32(1) (West 1988). For the text of the rule, see supra note 1.
15. Brief for the Appellant, supra note 12, at 7.
16. See infra notes 17-37 and accompanying text.
17. Brief for the Appellant, supra note 12, at 7. Counsel challenged the Rule requiring
appointed appellate counsel, in order to withdraw from an appeal, to file a No-Merit Brief
stating why the appeal is frivolous. Motion to Determine Constitutionality of Rule 809.32(1)
and to Clarify Scope of Attorney's Representation on Appeal, Joint Appendix at J.A. 4-7,
McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, District 1, 108 S. Ct. 1895 (1988) (No. 87-5002)
(motion in the Wisconsin Court of Appeals dated August 14, 1984). For the text of Rule
809.32, see supra note 1.
18. See Motion to Determine Constitutionality of Rule 809.32(1) and to Clarify Scope of
Attorney's Representation on Appeal, Joint Appendix at J.A. 4-7, McCoy v. Court of Appeals
of Wisconsin, District 1, 108 S. Ct. 1895 (1988) (No. 87-5002) (motion in the Wisconsin Court
of Appeals dated August 14, 1984); Brief for the Appellant, supra note 12, at 7.
19. Order of Wisconsin Court of Appeals, Joint Appendix at J.A. 8.10, McCoy v. Court of
Appeals of Wisconsin, District 1, 108 S. Ct. 1895 (1988) (No. 87-5002) (order denying Motion
to Determine Constitutionality of Rule 809.32(1) and to Clarify Scope of Attorney's
Representation on Appeal).
20. Id.
21. Brief for the Appellant, supra note 12, at 7; No-Merit Brief, supra note 8, at J.A. 11-27.
22. See No-Merit Brief, supra note 8, at J.A. 16-17, 22-26. The defendant's counsel first
argued that the state's negligent failure to conduct an appropriate test for gonorrhea (a test
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discussion of the reasons why he believes an appeal lacks any arguable
merit violates his indigent client's right to receive the effective assist-
ance of counsel under the sixth and fourteenth amendments of the
United States Constitution. Section II describes the development of
the right to counsel and focuses particularly on the minimal advocacy
that the Constitution guarantees an indigent defendant, even when his
appellate attorney has concluded that further proceedings would be
frivolous. Section III discusses the holding and reasoning of the
Supreme Court in McCoy. Section IV then analyzes whether the
McCoy decision can be reconciled with prior Supreme Court cases
that involve the right to counsel, particularly with Anders v. Califor-
nia. In addition, Section V examines the consequences that the
McCoy decision will have on the right to counsel and whether certain
goals underlying the Wisconsin Rule's discussion requirement remain,
in reality, unsatisfied. Finally, this Note concludes in Section VI that
the discussion requirement poses great risks to minimal constitutional
advocacy and may not serve the goals underlying the ethical obliga-
tions of an appellate attorney who deems an appeal frivolous-obliga-
tions that purportedly justify the discussion requirement.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
The sixth amendment guarantees defendants the right to the
assistance of counsel in criminal proceedings.39 Initially, the Supreme
Court interpreted the Constitution to guarantee the assistance of
counsel only to nonindigent defendants.' An indigent defendant was
deemed not to have a constitutional right to have appointed counsel
represent him at trial. 1  In Gideon v. Wainwright,42 however, the
Supreme Court extended the sixth amendment right to counsel,
through incorporation into the fourteenth amendment, to provide
indigent defendants with appointed counsel at trial 3.4  Nevertheless,
38. 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
39. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. In 1791, the states ratified the sixth amendment as part of the
Bill of Rights.
40. Although nonindigent defendants were guaranteed the right to representation by
retained counsel, indigent defendants were not guaranteed the appointment of counsel. See
Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 471 (1942) (The fourteenth amendment did not command
representation by an attorney in all cases, or for all offenses-including cases involving
sentences of incarceration.), overruled by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963).
41. Id.
42. 372 U.S. 335 (1963); see also Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357-58 (1963)
(holding that indigent defendants are guaranteed the right to the assistance of appointed
counsel on appeal under the fourteenth amendment); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63
(1938) (construing the sixth amendment right to counsel as requiring the appointment of
counsel for indigent defendants in federal cases).
43. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 343-45.
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defendant's counsel also requested permission to withdraw as coun-
sel24 based on his conclusion that the appeal "would be frivolous and
without any arguable merit within the meaning of Anders v. Califor-
nia. "25 He did not comply, however, with the Wisconsin Rule's
requirement that he discuss why the appeal lacked merit.26 Instead,
the brief discussed the reasons why the rule violated the defendant's
sixth amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel.27 The
appellate court struck the No-Merit Brief for failure to comply with
Rule 809.32(1) because the defendant's counsel did not include the
reasons why the appeal lacked merit.28 Moreover, the appellate court
ordered the defendant's counsel to file a No-Merit Brief that complied
with Rule 809.32(1).29
The defendant's counsel then filed a petition in the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin seeking a supervisory writ of prohibition and
declaratory relief.30 The Supreme Court of Wisconsin denied the peti-
tion based on the fact that a remedy was still available in the court of
appeals by renewing the motion for a determination of the constitu-
tionality of Rule 809.32(1).31 As a result, the defendant's counsel
resulting in an inconclusive negative result) had deprived McCoy of evidence material to his
defense-a deprivation denying him due process and requiring a new trial. Id. at J.A. 22-23,
26. He then challenged the taking of blood, hair, saliva, and gonorrhea test samples from
McCoy, outside the presence of his attorney and following an ex parte proceeding for the
issuance of a search warrant. Id. at J.A. 24. These events occurred after the complaint in the
action had been filed, and therefore the defendant's counsel argued that McCoy's right to
counsel and his statutory right to be present at the evidentiary search warrant proceeding had
been violated. Id. at J.A. 24-25. Finally, the defendant's counsel argued that the evidence was
insufficient and that the sentence was excessive. Id. at J.A. 26.
23. See id. at J.A. 18-22.
24. See id. at J.A. 27.
25. Id. at J.A. 14.
26. See id. at J.A. 14-16. The No-Merit Brief filed by the defendant's counsel in the
appellate court satisfied the other requirements of the rule. State ex rel. McCoy v. Wisconsin
Court of Appeals, District 1, 137 Wis. 2d 90, 92, 403 N.W.2d 449, 450 (1987), aff'd, 108 S. Ct.
1895 (1988). For the Wisconsin Rule's requirement that the brief discuss why the appeal lacks
merit, see Wis. STAT. ANN. § 809.32(1) (West 1988); supra note 1.
27. See No-Merit Brief, supra note 8, at J.A. 15-16.
28. Order of Wisconsin Court of Appeals, Joint Appendix at J.A. 29-30, McCoy v. Court
of Appeals of Wisconsin, District 1, 108 S. Ct. 1895 (1988) (No. 87-5002) (order striking No-
Merit Brief in the Court of Appeals and directing counsel to file a No-Merit Brief in
compliance with Rule 809.32(1)).
29. Id. at J.A. 30.
30. Petition for Supervisory Writ of Prohibition and Declaration of Relator's Rights, Joint
Appendix at J.A. 31-36, McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, District 1, 108 S. Ct. 1895
(1988) (No. 87-5002) (petition in the Supreme Court of Wisconsin dated April 23, 1985).
31. Order of Supreme Court of Wisconsin, Joint Appendix at J.A. 37-38, McCoy v. Court
of Appeals of Wisconsin, District 1, 108 S. Ct. 1895 (1988) (No. 87-5002) (order denying
Petition for Supervisory Writ of Prohibition and Declaration of Relator's Rights).
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renewed the motion in the court of appeals.32 This time the appellate
court denied the motion on the basis that the constitutionality of the
rule had to be determined by the authors of the rule-the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin.33 The appellate court again ordered counsel to
file a complying No-Merit Brief.34
The defendant's counsel renewed his petition to the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin seeking a supervisory writ of prohibition and
declaratory relief.35 The court granted the petition for declaratory
relief insofar as it sought a declaratory judgment; 36 however, it upheld
the constitutionality of Rule 809.32(1), despite its own admission that
the Rule's requirement that a withdrawing attorney discuss why an
appeal lacked merit exceeded the requirements set forth by the United
States Supreme Court in Anders.37
The defendant's counsel then appealed the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin's unfavorable ruling on the constitutionality of Rule
809.32(1) to the United States Supreme Court. On appeal, the
Supreme Court held, affirmed: If an appointed appellate attorney
requests permission to withdraw from an appeal due to a belief that
the appeal is frivolous, requiring the attorney to discuss the reasons
why the appeal is frivolous does not violate the client's sixth and four-
teenth amendment rights to the effective assistance of counsel. McCoy
v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, District 1, 108 S. Ct. 1895 (1988).
This Note examines whether an appointed appellate attorney's
32. Motion to Determine Constitutionality of Rule 809.32(1) and to Clarify Scope of
Attorney's Representation on Appeal, Joint Appendix at J.A. 39-44, McCoy v. Court of
Appeals of Wisconsin, District 1, 108 S. Ct. 1895 (1988) (No. 87-5002) (renewed motion in the
Wisconsin Court of Appeals dated June 4, 1985).
33. Amended Order of the Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, District I, Joint Appendix at
J.A. 45-47, McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, District 1, 108 S. Ct. 1895 (1988) (No.
87-5002) (amended order denying Motion to Determine Constitutionality of Rule 809.32(1)
and to Clarify Scope of Attorney's Representation on Appeal, and directing the filing of a No-
Merit Brief in compliance with Rule 809.32(1)). The appellate court ruled that it was unable
to determine the constitutionality of Rule 809.32(1) because the rule was a procedural rule
regulating the practices of the appellate courts. Id. at J.A. 46. As a result, only the regulating
court (the Supreme Court of Wisconsin) that authored the rule could determine its
constitutionality-the regulated appellate courts could not. Id.
34. Id. at J.A. 47.
35. Petition for Supervisory Writ of Prohibition and Declaration of Relator's Rights, Joint
Appendix at J.A. 48-55, McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, District 1, 108 S. Ct. 1895
(1988) (No. 87-5002) (renewed petition in the Supreme Court of Wisconsin dated January 21,
1986).
36. Order of Supreme Court of Wisconsin, Joint Appendix at J.A. 106-07, McCoy v.
Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, District 1, 108 S. Ct. 1895 (1988) (No. 87-5002) (order
granting Petition for Supervisory Writ of Prohibition and Declaration of Relator's Rights,
insofar as it sought declaratory relief with respect to Rule 809.32(1)).
37. State ex rel. McCoy v. Wisconsin Court of Appeals, District 1, 137 Wis. 2d 90, 97, 403
N.W.2d 449, 452 (1987), aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 1895 (1988).
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the Supreme Court subsequently limited this right to cases in which
the indigent was incarcerated. 44
In Douglas v. California,4" the Supreme Court extended the sixth
amendment right to counsel to provide indigent criminal defendants
with appointed counsel on first appeals granted as a matter of right.4"
In Anders v. California,47 the Court further guaranteed indigent
defendants that, even if court-appointed appellate counsel considered
the appeal frivolous and requested to withdraw from the case,
appointed counsel must function as an advocate48 and accompany a
request to withdraw with "a brief referring to anything in the record
that might arguably support the appeal."'49 Thus indigents are consti-
tutionally entitled to the effective assistance of an attorney on a first
appeal as a matter of rightI°--nominal representation is not enough.
Moreover, in Anders, the Supreme Court addressed the sixth
amendment right to counsel and right to active advocacy in the con-
text of frivolous appeals. 1 Anders provided a solution to the problem
that arises when appointed appellate attorneys seek to withdraw from
appeals they believe are frivolous. The Anders solution and its goal of
advocacy for indigent defendants are based on two constitutional
guarantees: adversarial due process and equal protection.52
A. The Initial Solution of Anders v. California
In 1967, the Supreme Court raised the minimum level of advo-
44. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979). In Scott, an indigent defendant had been charged
and convicted of an offense that was punishable by a fine, incarceration, or both. Id. at 368.
The state did not provide the defendant with appointed counsel, and subsequently, the
defendant was convicted and fined. Id. The United States Supreme Court held that the threat
of incarceration was not sufficient to warrant the mandatory appointment of counsel. Id. at
373-74. According to the Court, the sixth and fourteenth amendment right to counsel requires
only that indigent defendants not be sentenced to imprisonment without the assistance of
appointed counsel. Id. But see Herman & Thompson, Scott v. Illinois and the Right to
Counsel: A Decision in Search of a Doctrine? 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 71 (1979) (critiquing the
doctrinal analysis of Scott and its underlying motivation to avoid implementing a right to
counsel with economically impracticable cost burdens).
45. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
46. Id. at 357-58.
47. 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
48. Id. at 744.
49. Id.
50. See Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985). In Evitts, retained counsel had failed to file a
required statement of appeal, and his client's appeal had been dismissed as a result. Id. at 389-
90. The Supreme Court held that due process required the effective assistance of counsel on
first appeals as a matter of right-whether counsel was retained or appointed. Id. at 396-97.
51. 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
52. Evitts, 469 U.S. at 402-05 (noting the due process and equal protection bases in right to
counsel cases and citing Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967), as support for the
proposition).
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cacy that appointed appellate counsel must provide to indigent
defendants by requiring appointed appellate counsel to file what has
become known as an "Anders brief."15 3 In Anders, the defendant had
been convicted of felony marijuana possession, and his motion for the
appointment of appellate counsel had been granted.5 4 The appointed
attorney studied the record and consulted Anders, but concluded that
there was no merit to the appeal." He then advised the California
District Court of Appeal of his conclusion.56 The California appellate
court then denied Anders' request for another appointed attorney and
affirmed his conviction." In addition, both the appellate court and
the Supreme Court of California denied the defendant a writ of
habeas corpus. 8
The United States Supreme Court granted the defendant's peti-
tion for certiorari and held that the California procedure allowing an
appointed attorney to withdraw from an appeal after he advised the
appellate court that the appeal lacked merit "[did] not comport with
fair procedure and lack[ed] that equality that is required by the Four-
teenth Amendment." 59 The Court stressed the paramount impor-
tance of the attorney's role as an advocate: "The constitutional
requirement of substantial equality and fair process can only be
attained where counsel acts in the role of an active advocate in behalf
of his client, as opposed to that of amicus curiae."'  The Court
acknowledged that counsel should advise the court and request per-
mission to withdraw if a conscientious examination of the case led
him to conclude that the appeal was frivolous.6 The Court, however,
held that such a request "must... be accompanied by a brief referring
to anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal."62
53. Anders, 386 U.S. at 744-45.
54. Id. at 739.
55. Id.
56. Id. In Anders, the Supreme Court noted the possible dangers of an attorney's
conclusion that an appeal is without merit. See id. at 742-43. The defendant's appellate
attorney failed to act as an advocate and to challenge comments that the trial judge and the
prosecutor made to the jury regarding the defendant's failure to testify. Id. at 743. The
Supreme Court's decision striking down article I, § 13 of the California constitution, which
permitted comment on a defendant's failure to testify-comment that the defendant's appellate
attorney concluded was no basis for a meritorious appeal-highlights the danger that exists if
counsel concludes that an appeal is without merit and fails to act as an advocate. See Griffin v.
California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965) (holding that the fifth and fourteenth amendments forbid
comment on a defendant's failure to testify).
57. Anders, 386 U.S. at 740.
58. Id. at 740-41.
59. Id. at 741.
60. Id. at 744.
61. Id.
62. Id. The Court emphasized that "[c]ounsel should, and can with honor and without
[Vol. 43:921
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The Court noted that such requirements "would not force appointed
counsel to brief his case against his client."63 Rather, it would afford
the indigent client the same degree of advocacy that nonindigents
could obtainS--advocacy that was constitutionally required for sub-
stantial equality and fair process.65 The Court further noted that the
appellate court, not the defendant's counsel, must examine all the pro-
ceedings after receiving the Anders brief and must decide whether to
allow counsel to withdraw if the appellate court independently deter-
mines the appeal to be frivolous.66
Over the years, courts have applied the solution provided in
Anders to situations in which an appointed appellate counsel believes
that his client's appeal is frivolous. 67 This application of Anders, and
its underlying rationale of ensuring effective advocacy through the
constitutional guarantees of adversarial due process and equal protec-
tion, form the basic foundation of this Note's analysis of the McCoy
decision.
B. The Constitutional Right to Counsel Within
the Adversary System
An analysis of the McCoy decision and its effects upon the rights
of indigent defendants requires an examination of the nature of the
sixth amendment right to counsel, a right grounded in the United
States' system of criminal justice. The United States Supreme Court
has determined that "[t]he very premise of our adversary system of
criminal justice is that partisan advocacy on both sides of a case will
best promote the ultimate objective that the guilty be convicted and
the innocent go free."68 The Supreme Court raised the adversarial
conflict, be of more assistance to his client and to the court. His role as advocate requires that
he support his client's appeal to the best of his ability." Id. (footnote omitted).
63. Id. at 745. In stating that an Anders brief will not force an appointed appellate
attorney to "brief his case against his client," id., the Anders Court apparently meant that the
appointed attorney would not be forced to brief the case in a manner contrary to his indigent
client's interests.
64. Id. at 745.
65. See supra text accompanying note 60. For a discussion of the interplay between the
fourteenth amendment due process and equal protection rights and their functions as
independent support for the right to counsel, see infra text accompanying notes 81-84.
66. Anders, 386 U.S. at 744. The Supreme Court stated that the required No-Merit Brief
would "induce the [appellate] court to pursue all the more vigorously its own review." Id. at
745. This statement indicates the importance of the appellate court's independence, although
the Anders brief aids the court's review. Ultimately, the appellate court is to review the
proceedings as an independent arbiter who decides whether the appeal is frivolous.
67. See infra notes 68-92 and accompanying text.
68. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 394 (1985) (quoting Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853,
862 (1975)); see also Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318 (1981) ("The system assumes
that adversarial testing will ultimately advance the public interest in truth and fairness."); see
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:921
character of criminal proceedings to the level of a constitutional guar-
antee because the loss of adversarial confrontation results in the fail-
ure of the necessary "testing" of cases through partisan advocacy,
which ensures accordance with the sixth amendment.69
The testing of a case through the adversarial process requires
representation by an attorney. 70 A defendant who lacks the partisan
advocacy of counsel at either the trial or the appellate stage of crimi-
nal proceedings will be unable to protect himself, assert his rights, or
put forward arguments when confronted with the substantive and
procedural intricacies of the legal system.7 ' In fact, it is widely recog-
nized that representation by counsel is necessary for these purposes.72
The sixth amendment guarantee of assistance of counsel is not
satisfied, however, when an attorney is simply present as appointed
counsel. In order to truly assist his client, an appointed attorney must
generally Goodpaster, On the Theory of American Adversary Criminal Trial, 78 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 118 (1987) (discussing the adversary system, particularly in the trial context).
But see generally Shaffer, The Unique, Novel, and Unsound Adversary Ethic, 41 VAND. L. REV.
697 (1988) (critiquing the general principles of the adversary system and the adversary ethic).
69. See United States v. Cronic, 446 U.S. 648, 656-57 (1984) (relying on adversarial testing
as a basis for the requirement of effective representation at trial). In Cronic, the Supreme
Court stressed the constitutional importance of adversarial proceedings in providing "the kind
of testing envisioned by the Sixth Amendment." Id. at 656. The testing that the adversarial
system contemplates concerns achieving true and fair judicial results-results that can best be
achieved through the adversary system. See Penson v. Ohio, 109 S. Ct. 346, 352 (1988); supra
note 68 and accompanying text.
70. "[I]n our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too
poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him."
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963); see also Penson, 109 S. Ct. at 352 (noting that
forceful and careful advocacy are required at both the trial and appellate stages of a criminal
prosecution); Evitts, 469 U.S. at 394 (discussing a defendant's need for the services of an
attorney, whether at trial or on appeal); Cronic, 446 U.S. at 653 ("Lawyers in criminal cases
'are necessities, not luxuries.'" (quoting Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344)). But see Scott v. Illinois,
440 U.S. 367 (1979) (limiting the constitutional right to appointed counsel to cases in which
the defendant is actually imprisoned); Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974) (limiting
constitutional right to appointed counsel to first appeals as a matter of right).
71. See Penson, 109 S. Ct. at 352 ("Absent representation... it is unlikely that a criminal
defendant will be able adequately to test the government's case .... "); Evitts, 469 U.S. at 396
("[A] criminal appellant must face an adversary proceeding that-like a trial-is governed by
intricate rules that to a layperson would be hopelessly forbidding."); Cronic, 446 U.S. at 653-54
(stating that counsel is "essential" to the assertion of a defendant's rights and the preparation
of his defense); Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 343 (1980) (noting that "serious risk of
injustice infects the trial" if a defendant does not have counsel to provide procedural and
substantive safeguards).
72. See, e.g., Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344 ("That government hires lawyers to prosecute and
defendants who have the money hire lawyers to defend are the strongest indications of the
widespread belief that lawyers in criminal courts are necessities, not luxuries."); see also supra
note 70 and accompanying text (discussing the requirement of legal representation within the
adversarial system).
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serve as an active advocate.7 3 It will not suffice for- counsel either to
serve as an amicus curiae74 or to act as a friend of the court; 7' his
client-not the court-is guaranteed the "assistance of counsel."76
This guarantee of effective assistance of counsel through active advo-
cacy underlies the Anders decision.77
C. Equal Protection and the Discussion Requirement
In order to satisfy the due process requirements of the adver-
sarial system, the right to the assistance of counsel guarantees the
indigent defendant the right to appointed counsel. 78 The right to the
assistance of counsel further implicates the fourteenth amendment's
equal protection guarantee. 79 The equal protection right to counsel
arises from the need to prevent discrimination against indigents'
access to a fair and equal system of justice.80 Both the equal protec-
tion basis of the right to counsel and the adversarial due process basis
independently support the right to counsel," and each basis involves a
73. See Evitts, 469 U.S. at 394; Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967); see also
Cronic, 446 U.S. at 654 (asserting that the sixth amendment "requires not merely the provision
of counsel to the accused, but 'Assistance,' which is to be 'for his defence.' ") (quoting U.S.
CONST. amend. VI).
74. Anders, 386 U.S. at 744.
75. Evitts, 469 U.S. at 394.
76. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744 (discussing the need for active advocacy on behalf of the
client-acting as a friend of the court is insufficient).
77. See id.
78. See supra notes 68-77 and accompanying text.
79. See Anders, 386 U.S. 738 (guaranteeing an indigent defendant, through appointed
appellate counsel's presentation of anything arguably supporting the appeal, the equivalent
degree of advocacy that a nonindigent is able to obtain); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353
(1963) (guaranteeing indigent defendants appointed appellate counsel); Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335 (1963) (guaranteeing indigent defendants appointed trial counsel); infra notes 80
& 85-92 and accompanying text.
In Gideon, the Supreme Court held that "[the right of one charged with crime to counsel
may not be deemed fundamental and essential to fair trials in some countries, but it is in ours."
Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344; see also Penson v. Ohio, 109 S. Ct. 346, 351-52 (1988) ("IT]he right to
be represented by counsel is among the most fundamental of rights."). The Gideon Court also
held that "a provision of the Bill of Rights which is 'fundamental and essential to a fair trial' is
made obligatory upon the States by the Fourteenth Amendment." Gideon, 372 U.S. at 342
(overruling Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 471 (1942)).
80. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 745; Douglas, 372 U.S. at 357-58 (noting the lack of equal
representation if the unrepresented indigent "has only the right to a meaningless ritual, while
the [represented] rich man has a meaningful appeal."); Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344-45 (noting that
the ideal that every defendant stands equal before the law cannot be realized if the indigent
defendant is unassisted by an attorney).
81. See Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 403-05 (1985) (discussing the existence and
convergence of both equal protection and due process rationales as independent support for
the right to counsel). For a discussion of adversarial due process, see supra notes 68-77 and
accompanying text.
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separate inquiry. s2 The adversarial due process basis of the right to
counsel concerns itself with the fair treatment of the individual in the
state's provision of effective advocacy and adversarial testing,
"regardless of how other individuals in the same situation may be
treated."" a On the other hand, the equal protection basis of the right
to counsel guards against disparate treatment of indigent and nonindi-
gent defendants in the state's provision of advocacy and judicial
process.
8 4
The United States Supreme Court established the equal protec-
tion basis of the right to appellate counsel in Douglas v. California.5
The Douglas Court declared unconstitutional a practice embodied in a
California rule of criminal procedure that permitted appellate courts,
upon an indigent's request for counsel, independently to investigate
the record and make the appointment of counsel, only if the appoint-
ment would help the indigent or the court.8 6 That practice deprived
indigents appealing as a matter of right of the assistance of appellate
counsel, while allowing nonindigents to receive such assistance.8 7 The
Court reasoned that "there can be no equal justice where the kind of
an appeal a man enjoys 'depends on the amount of money he has.' "t88
The fourteenth amendment right to equal protection also served
as a basis for the requirement of active advocacy in the form of the
Anders brief.8 9 Thus the equal protection guarantee of the assistance
of counsel requires an attorney's active advocacy as well as his pres-
ence.9" Furthermore, because the nature of the adversarial system
and the associated due process concerns guarantee the effective assist-
ance of appellate counsel, rather than mere nominal representation, 91
the right to effective counsel applies "without regard to whether coun-
sel is retained or appointed." 92 The right to effective counsel is there-
82. Evitts, 469 U.S. at 405.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
86. Id. at 355.
87. Id. at 355-56.
88. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 355 (1963) (citing Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12,
19 (1956)).
89. "[Appointed counsel's brief) will assure penniless defendants the same rights and
opportunities on appeal-as nearly as is practicable-as are enjoyed by those persons who are
in a similar situation but who are able to afford the retention of private counsel." Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738, 745 (1967). In fact, the Supreme Court stated in Anders that only by
requiring counsel to be an active advocate could "[t]he constitutional requirement of
substantial equality and fair process ... be attained." Id. at 744.
90. Id.
91. See Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 396 (1985) ("[A] party whose counsel is unable to
provide effective representation is in no better position than one who has no counsel at all.").
92. Id. at 395 (citing Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 342-45 (1980) (noting that
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fore an equal protection guarantee as much as it is a due process
guarantee.
III. THE HOLDING OF McCOY
In McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, District 1,93 the
United States Supreme Court upheld a Wisconsin statute that
requires an appointed appellate attorney seeking to withdraw from a
case to discuss the reasons behind his conclusion that his client's
appeal is frivolous.94 The Supreme Court held that this discussion did
not violate indigent defendants' sixth amendment rights to counsel or
fourteenth amendment rights to due process and equal protection.95
Although the Supreme Court maintained that indigent defendants are
entitled to effective representation by active advocates as an essential
element of the United States' adversary system of criminal justice,96 it
also stated that attorneys have professional and ethical obligations not
to bring frivolous appeals. 97 Thus the Court recognized the apparent
dilemma that appointed attorneys face when dealing with frivolous
appeals-the conflict between withdrawing on ethical grounds and
functioning as an effective advocate for the indigent defendant.98
Resolving the dilemma, the Court stated: Counsel must inform the
court of counsel's conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.99
Although the Supreme Court's remarks did not address the dis-
ineffective representation results when retained counsel represents conflicting interests at
trial)).
93. McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, District 1, 108 S. Ct. 1895 (1988).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1904.
96. Id. at 1900.
97. Id. at 1900-01. The Supreme Court stated the reasons for these professional and
ethical obligations as follows:
Neither paid nor appointed counsel may deliberately mislead the court with
respect to either the facts or the law, or consume the time and energies of the
court or the opposing party by advancing frivolous arguments. An attorney,
whether appointed or paid, is therefore under an ethical obligation to refuse to
prosecute a frivolous appeal.
Id. at 1900. The Court then referred to American Bar Association standards as additional
authority for this professional and ethical obligation. See id. at 1900 n.8 (citing I ABA STAN-
DARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 4-3.9 commentary at 4-52 to -53 (2d ed. 1980); ABA Comm.
on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 955 (1975) (Obligation to take Crimi-
nal Appeal)). But see Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 754 n.6 (asserting that practices recog-
nized by the American Bar Association as desirable are not necessarily constitutionally
required).
98. McCoy, 108 S. Ct. at 1901.
99. Id. (relying on Ellis v. United States, 356 U.S. 674, 675 (1958) (stating that counsel
could be allowed leave to withdraw if convinced that the appeal was frivolous) and Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967) ("[I]f counsel finds his case to be wholly frivolous, after a
conscientious examination of it, he should so advise the court ....")).
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cussion requirement in the Wisconsin Rules of Appellate Procedure
directly, the Court noted that the fact that counsel files a motion to
withdraw from an appeal does not in itself reflect that an indigent
defendant has received less effective representation than a nonindigent
defendant. " The Court further noted that the ethical obligation not
to prosecute frivolous appeals restricts the breadth of permissible
advocacy by both retained and appointed counsel.1"1 The Court rea-
soned that, because no violation of an indigent client's rights occurs
when his appointed attorney advises the court of his conclusion that
the appeal is frivolous, "it must follow that no constitutional depriva-
tion occurs when the attorney explains the basis for that
conclusion. "102
In addition to recognizing appointed counsel's ethical obligation
not to prosecute frivolous appeals, the Court noted counsel's addi-
tional duty to file an Anders brief, referring to anything in the record
that might arguably support the appeal.103 According to the McCoy
Court, the Anders brief should assure an appellate court that a defend-
ant has received effective advocacy based upon counsel's "diligent and
thorough search of the record for any arguable claim."'" In addition,
the Court stated that the Anders brief should aid the appellate court in
determining whether counsel correctly concluded that the appeal was
100. McCoy, 108 S. Ct. at 1901. But see remarks of Justice Jack Day, Proceedings at the
National Judicial Conference on Standards for the Administration of Criminal Justice (1972),
57 F.R.D. 229, 309 (1973). Justice Day stated:
I can never remember a case, really never, in a long life at the Bar ... where if
the money was there the appeal was so frivolous that the lawyer couldn't make it.
I'm not suggesting nobody ever stood up and said grandly, "Take away that
$10,000; there's nothing to this case; I will not appeal it." Maybe that happened,
but maybe there are angels in the balcony, too .... Moreover, there is always the
probability that unless there's an excellent reason, beyond being busy, the lawyer
at least ought to be told that he might try to present what the client wanted. He
doesn't have .to argue as his own points matters that are stupid or ridiculous, but
at least there ought to be some effort made to present the point the client believes
important.
Id.
101. McCoy, 108 S. Ct. at 1901. See supra note 97.
102. McCoy, 108 S. Ct. at 1904. The Court was disingenuous in reasoning that, because an
appointed attorney can constitutionally advise the court that he has concluded that his client's
appeal is frivolous, it follows that explaining the basis for that conclusion also violates no
rights. The Supreme Court's reasoning on this issue was disingenuous because its statement
resolves the fundamental issue in the case without addressing the reasons why a conclusion of
frivolousness, supported by discussion, is no different than the "bald conclusion." Indeed, the
No-Merit Brief filed in the Wisconsin Court of Appeals on behalf of the defendant concluded
that the appeal was frivolous, but challenged only the constitutionality of the discussion
requirement. See No-Merit Brief, supra note 8, at J.A. 14-16.
103. McCoy, 108 S. Ct. at 1903-04.
104. Id. at 1903.
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frivolous."°5 With these purposes in mind, the McCoy Court con-
cluded that the Wisconsin Rule "merely requires that the attorney go
one step further"' 6 by providing additional evidence of diligence,
thus "further[ing] the same interests that are served by the minimum
requirements of Anders."'
' 0 7
IV. THE CONFLICTING DUTIES OF APPOINTED APPELLATE
COUNSEL IN DISCUSSING FRIVOLOUS APPEALS
Although attorneys must meet ethical and professional obliga-
tions, they must also act in accordance with the United States Consti-
tution. In meeting these ethical and professional obligations,
appointed appellate attorneys must provide advocacy consistent with
the constitutional guarantees of adversarial due process and equal
protection.
A. Whether McCoy's Discussion Requirement is Consistent with
Adversarial Due Process
In McCoy, the Supreme Court recognized indigent defendants'
sixth and fourteenth amendment rights to the assistance of counsel
and the maintenance of adversary proceedings.' 08 The Court con-
cluded, however, that Wisconsin's requirement that counsel discuss
why an appeal is frivolous did not violate these rights."' 9 The Court
reasoned that Wisconsin's requirement that counsel present any
points of arguable merit 110 guarantees counsel's diligent review of the
appeal and zealous advocacy, in accordance with the requirements of
Anders."'
The Court, however, viewed the Anders brief as no substitute for
an advocate's brief."I2 Rather, the Court stated that the Anders brief
was designed to aid a reviewing court in evaluating two concerns:
105. Id. at 1902-04.
106. Id. at 1904.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1900, 1902, 1904.
109. Id. at 1903-05.
110. The Wisconsin Rule incorporates Anders and requires the appointed attorney to file
copies of a brief "in which is stated anything in the record that might arguably support the
appeal." WIs. STAT. ANN. § 809.32(1) (West 1988).
111. McCoy, 108 S. Ct. at 1905.
112. Id. at 1902 n. 13. The Supreme Court's position that the Anders brief is not a substitute
for an advocate's brief seems disingenuous in light of both the Anders decision and the
Wisconsin Rule. In fact, the Anders Court stated that it intended the Anders brief to afford the
indigent defendant active advocacy. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744-45 (1967). In
addition, the No-Merit Brief required by Wisconsin can be potentially the only brief--other
than a pro se brief-that will be filed on behalf of an indigent defendant. See Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 809.32(3) (West 1988) (stating that the court of appeals "shall affirm the judgment of
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
(1) whether counsel had provided the client with constitutionally ade-
quate representation; and (2) whether the appeal was so frivolous that
counsel should be allowed to withdraw.' 13  When interpreting the
constitutionality of the Wisconsin Rule's discussion requirement, the
McCoy Court took into account an appellate court's need for aid in
evaluating both counsel's performance and the frivolous nature of the
appeal. 14 In its decision, the Court also considered counsel's ethical
and professional duty not to advance frivolous appeals or mislead; in
fact, it relied upon rules of ethics requiring disclosure of facts and law
contrary to a client's interest.11 5
In the context of evaluating counsel's performance on behalf of
his client, the McCoy Court asserted that the Wisconsin Rule's discus-
sion requirement served as additional evidence to an appellate court
of counsel's diligence, thereby furthering the interests in active advo-
cacy that the Anders Court recognized. 1 6 The McCoy Court also
stated that the discussion requirement would aid counsel in uncover-
ing unrecognized aspects of law, thereby guarding against mistaken
conclusions of frivolousness. 17 Furthermore, the Court stated that
the discussion requirement would assist the appellate court in deter-
mining whether the appeal was frivolous.' 1 Moreover, because rules
of ethics obligated counsel to disclose facts and law contrary to his
client's interests 1 9 and to reveal a conclusion of frivolousness, 120 the
McCoy Court found that discussion would not "deny [indigent
defendants] the effective assistance of counsel any more than the rules
of ethics [would]."
' 121
There seems to be no reason why a defendant would object to a
requirement that an appointed attorney assure an appellate court that
conviction and the denial of any postconviction motion" in the event that it finds the appeal
frivolous and without any arguable merit).
113. McCoy, 108 S. Ct. at 1902. See also Penson v. Ohio, 109 S. Ct. 346, 350-51 (1988)
(citing McCoy as support for the "twin functions" view of the Anders brief).
114. McCoy, 108 S. Ct. at 1902-04.
115. Id. at 1900 n,8, 1903 n.14 (citing I ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 4-3.9
commentary at 4-52 to -53 (2d ed. 1980); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility, Informal Op. 955 (1975) (Obligation to Take Criminal Appeal); MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3 (1984) (discussing disclosure of facts and law to
the tribunal)); see also supra note 97 (discussing the professional and ethical obligations of
attorneys).
116. McCoy, 108 S. Ct. at 1904.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1903 (citing MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3 (1984)).
120. Id. at 1901.
121. Id. at 1903-04. But see infra notes 126-29 and accompanying text (discussing the
differences in the relative positions of indigent defendants whose appointed attorneys discuss
frivolousness and nonindigent defendants whose retained attorneys make ethical disclosures).
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the record on appeal had been diligently reviewed and any arguable
points had been advanced. Anders, however, not only requires that
the appellate court be assured that there is effective representation,
but it also requires that counsel provide such representation.12 2 The
Wisconsin discussion requirement might aid a court in evaluating
counsel's diligence on behalf of his client, but by requiring discussion
as to why the appeal is frivolous, the rule effectively requires
appointed counsel to present law and facts detrimental to the interests
of his indigent client and in favor of assisting the appellate court. The
McCoy Court, however, asserted that the Supreme Court of Wiscon-
sin's interpretation of the Wisconsin Rule 2 3 did not place counsel in
the role of amicus curiae. 124  Even if the Wisconsin Rule does not
impose that role, it still allows an appointed attorney the latitude to
engage in discussion as to why an appeal is frivolous to the degree that
he may act as an amicus curiae, or even argue against his client.' 2 5
122. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744-45 (1967). In Anders, the Supreme Court
asserted that the Anders brief would afford an indigent the active advocacy of counsel as well
as aid an appellate court's evaluation of the advocacy provided. Id. at 744-45. See also supra
notes 60-66 and accompanying text (discussing Anders' emphasis on active advocacy).
123. In evaluating the constitutionality of Rule 809.32(1), the McCoy Court analyzed the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin's construction of the discussion requirement. McCoy, 108 S. Ct.
at 1902-03. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin construed the rule as follows:
We interpret the discussion rule to require a statement of reasons why the
appeal lacks merit which might include, for example, a brief summary of any
case or statutory authority which appears to support the attorney's conclusions,
or a synopsis of those facts in the record which might compel reaching that same
result. We do not contemplate the discussion rule to require an attorney to
engage in a protracted argument in favor of the conclusion reached; rather, we
view the rule as an attempt to provide the court with "notice" that there are facts
on record or cases or statutes on point which would seem to compel a conclusion
of no merit.
State ex rel. McCoy v. Wisconsin Court of Appeals, District 1, 137 Wis. 2d 90, 100, 403
N.W.2d 449, 454 (1987), aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 1895 (1988).
124. McCoy, 108 S. Ct. at 1904; see also United States v. Edwards, 777 F.2d 364, 365 (7th
Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (stating that appointed counsel seeking leave to withdraw should
identify any conceivable arguments for reversal and explain why such arguments are
frivolous); Nickols v. Gagnon, 454 F.2d 467, 469 (7th Cir. 1971) (approving a "reasoned
exposition" of the basis for appointed counsel's conclusion that the appeal was frivolous). But
see Camodeo v. United States, 387 U.S. 575 (1967) (per curiam), vacating 367 F.2d 146 (2d
Cir. 1966) (court relied on appointed counsel's summary of the record which supported
conviction); Ellis v. United States, 356 U.S. 674 (1958) (per curiam), vacating 249 F.2d 478
(D.C. Cir. 1957) (the appointed attorneys had performed the role of amici curiae by discussing
why the facts revealed the appeal was frivolous).
125. The Supreme Court in McCoy stated that the Wisconsin Rule did not place counsel in
the role of amicus curiae and did not pose the danger of improperly encouraging counsel to act
in that role. See McCoy, 108 S. Ct. at 1904. The Court's careful language implies, however,
that circumstances may exist in which counsel may act in the role of amicus curiae-or even
argue against his client-while attempting to satisfy the Wisconsin Rule's discussion
requirement. See id.; see also supra notes 60-66, 73-77 & 123-25 and accompanying text
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The McCoy Court's proposition that the effect of the rules of eth-
ics that require disclosure of facts and law contrary to the client's
interest does not differ appreciably from the effect of Wisconsin's dis-
cussion requirement presents several problems. The dilemma that the
Anders Court resolved-by requiring an attorney both to report the
conclusion that an appeal is frivolous and to report anything of argua-
ble merit 126 -appeared to strike a delicate balance between a client's
constitutional right to the assistance of counsel and an attorney's ethi-
cal duty to the appellate court. 127 In contrast to appointed counsel in
the frivolous appeal context, however, retained counsel in any setting
will maintain that his client's case has merit despite the disclosed con-
trary law and facts. 2 s Furthermore, retained counsel will present the
unfavorable law and facts in the best light for his client and explain
that his client should succeed on appeal. In this manner, retained
counsel provides effective representation for his nonindigent client. In
contrast, when an appointed attorney discusses why an appeal is friv-
olous, the conclusion can only serve to convince an appellate court
that the indigent client's appeal is frivolous.' 29 Although this discus-
sion is not in the client's interest, it seems to serve the interests of the
appellate court in making its evaluations of counsel's performance
and of the frivolous nature of the appeal.
Although a dilemma exists between representing the client as an
active advocate and making ethical disclosures, 30 the Supreme Court
has derided equivalent dilemmas, such as the kind that arise when
attorneys represent conflicting interests, as causing ineffective repre-
(discussing the importance of active advocacy and the inappropriateness of counsel acting as
an amicus curiae).
126. See supra notes 59-66 and accompanying text.
127. McCoy, 108 S. Ct. at 1906 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting the balancing of interests in
prior Supreme Court cases).
128. It seems preposterous to assume that anyone would retain an attorney who would
disclose facts and law contrary to his client's interest without maintaining that the law and
facts in his client's favor should result in a favorable judgment. Indeed, a litigant retains an
attorney for the precise purpose of arguing to a court that the law and facts favor his client's
case.
129. The discussion supporting why the appeal is frivolous appears to resemble an
argument on the merits due to the overall conclusion it reaches and supports-argument by
counsel against his client. Furthermore, the discussion's conclusion of frivolousness and the
reasons supporting the conclusion essentially resemble the outcome that prosecuting attorneys
strive for in preparing their appellate briefs against indigent defendants; prosecutors contend
that appeals lack merit and then discuss the reasons supporting their conclusion.
130. See McCoy, 108 S. Ct. at 1901 (acknowledging existence of dilemma between active,
partisan advocacy and ethical obligations to make disclosures). See generally Pengilly, Never
Cry Anders: The Ethical Dilemma of Counsel Appointed to Pursue a Frivolous Criminal
Appeal, 9 CRIM. JuST. J. 45 (1986) (discussing the ethical conflicts presented in the context of
frivolous appeals and approaches that various jurisdictions have taken).
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sentation 131 and therefore violating constitutional guarantees. The
dilemma between representing the client as an active advocate and
making ethical disclosures, however, can be adequately resolved, as
provided in Anders, by simply stating to an appellate court that coun-
sel found the appeal frivolous. The Anders resolution does not require
appointed counsel to discuss the reasons which support his conclusion
that the appeal is frivolous. 132 By following Anders and not requiring
the discussion, an appointed attorney can fulfill his ethical obligation
to an appellate court by giving the court notice that an appeal may be
frivolous, 13 3 without risking the loss of the partisan advocacy needed
to maintain adversarial proceedings.
With regard to providing assistance to the appellate court in
determining whether the appeal is frivolous, the McCoy decision
encourages an interpretation of Anders that is inconsistent with the
spirit of Anders. The purpose of the Anders brief is to allow an appel-
late court to evaluate the frivolous nature of an appeal and to ensure
that all the arguable points for the defendant are advocated in a parti-
san fashion.13 4 The appellate court, however, should be the final arbi-
ter of whether the appeal is frivolous.135 Furthermore, after receiving
references to anything that arguably might support the defendant's
appeal, the appellate court should conduct its own examination of the
131. McCoy, 108 S. Ct. at 1909 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446
U.S. 335, 350 (1980) (noting the ineffective representation that results when retained counsel
represents the conflicting interests of multiple defendants at trial)). Assisting the court and
serving the client can create conflicting interests. Concern over such conflicts can prompt a
court to admonish counsel against acting in the role of amicus curiae. See supra notes 59-66,
73-77 & 123-25 and accompanying text. In Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193 (1979) (denying
immunity for statutorily appointed attorneys and stating that the role of appointed attorneys
more nearly parallels that of retained attorneys than that of "officers of the court" who serve
society's interests as a whole), the Supreme Court commented on the conflicting roles of
appointed counsel and stated that appointed counsel was "to serve the undivided interest of his
client," and that an indispensable component of such service was acting independently of the
government to achieve that end. Id. at 203-05; see also supra note 129 (discussing how the
discussion requirement can lead to acts resembling those of prosecutors).
132. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967); see also Ellis v. United States, 356 U.S.
674 (1958) (per curiam), vacating 249 F.2d 478 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (the appointed attorneys had
performed the role of amici curiae by discussing why the facts revealed the appeal was
frivolous).
133. After all, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin stated that it viewed the purpose of the
discussion rule as providing notice to the court of the existence of facts or law compelling a
conclusion that an appeal lacked merit. State ex rel. McCoy v. Wisconsin Court of Appeals,
District 1, 137 Wis. 2d 90, 100, 403 N.W.2d 449, 454 (1987), aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 1895 (1988).
This notice provision also solves the ethical problem of misleading an appellate court when an
appeal is truly frivolous. See also supra note 97 (discussing the reasons behind the ethical and
professional obligations that arise when a frivolous appeal exists).
134. Anders, 386 U.S. at 744.
135. Id.
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proceedings.' 36 The independence of an appellate court's review may
be hindered, however, by appointed counsel's discussion and conclu-
sion that an appeal is frivolous. The risk of influencing an appellate
court's independent review by requiring discussion outweighs its need
for assistance, especially because an appellate court, after it has been
notified that the appeal may be frivolous, can readily determine that
an appeal is truly frivolous with minimal independent research., 37
Finally, although verification of a conclusion that an appeal is
frivolous may assist a client by uncovering any errors in the attorney's
analysis of the appeal, the actual submission to the appellate court of
the basis for this conclusion serves none of the client's interests.
1 38
Should counsel's verification of his conclusion that the appeal is frivo-
lous reveal that the appeal has merit, counsel will abandon plans to
withdraw and will not file a No-Merit Brief. Requiring counsel to
verify that an appeal is frivolous-because such a verification may
serve the legitimate purpose of ensuring counsel's diligence--can be
accomplished without counsel presenting reasons why an appeal lacks
merit. For example, requiring counsel to swear that diligent research
has verified that an appeal is frivolous could impart compliance with
the verification requirement and accomplish its goals, without posing
a risk to partisan advocacy on behalf of the client or to the integrity of
an appellate court's own review of the proceedings.
B. Whether McCoy's Discussion Requirement is Consistent with
Equal Protection
In McCoy, the Supreme Court recognized the equal protection
basis of the right to the effective assistance of appellate counsel1 39 and
stated that "[i]t is ... settled law that an indigent defendant has the
same right to effective representation by an active advocate as a
defendant who can afford to retain counsel of his or her choice.' 40
136. Id. at 744-45. See also Penson v. Ohio, 109 S. Ct. 346, 350, 351 (1988) (construing
McCoy as authority for the duty of an appellate court to conduct its own separate inquiry of
proceedings when evaluating frivolous appeals).
137. McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, District 1, 108 S. Ct. 1895, 1910 (1988)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (asserting that an appellate court can evaluate whether an appeal is
genuinely frivolous with minimal independent research); see also Camodeo v. United States,
387 U.S. 575 (1967) (per curiam), vacating 367 F.2d 146 (2d Cir. 1966) (appellate court relied
on appointed counsel's summary of the record-a summary supporting conviction-in
evaluating the frivolousness of the appeal).
138. See infra text accompanying notes 163-64. But see McCoy, 108 S. Ct. at 1904
(asserting that the required discussion served as additional evidence of counsel's diligence).
139. McCoy, 108 S. Ct. at 1900.
140. Id. The McCoy Court also stated that "[e]very advocate has essentially the same
professional responsibility ... [to] consistently serve the client's interest to the best of his or
her ability," regardless of whether they are retained or appointed. Id. at 1902.
[Vol. 43:921
1989] RIGHT TO COUNSEL AND FRIVOLOUS APPEALS 941
The Court also stated, however, that ethical concerns obligated both
retained and appointed attorneys to refuse to pursue frivolous
appeals.141 Conversely, the Court acknowledged the particular prob-
lem confronting appointed counsel when they are required to obtain
leave of court to withdraw and must opine that an appeal is frivolous
in order to withdraw.1 42 The reporting of a conclusion that an appeal
is frivolous, without further discussion, nonetheless resolves the
apparent dilemma between obligations to the court and to the indi-
gent defendant that confronts counsel.143 Moreover, the McCoy
Court noted that the discussion requirement does not violate equal
protection rights because "the principle of substantial equality is not
compromised when appointed counsel files a 'no merit' brief even
though such briefs are seldom, if ever, filed by retained counsel....
'[A]bsolute equality is not required.'""
The McCoy Court dispensed with the equal protection argument
against discussion based on the authority of Anders, 45 which held
that counsel's submission to an appellate court of his conclusion that
an appeal is frivolous does not violate equal protection guarantees.1 46
The McCoy Court found that "[a] supported conclusion that the
appeal is frivolous does not implicate Sixth or Fourteenth Amend-
ment concerns to any greater extent than does a bald conclusion." 47
The Court further found that, as in Anders, there was substantially no
disparate treatment of indigents, 148 and thus it concluded that equal
protection guarantees were not violated.'49
The McCoy Court's finding that the discussion requirement
presented no greater constitutional dangers than the bald conclusion
of frivolousness is troubling because the rule requires the attorney to
disclose and to discuss law and facts that are contrary to the interests
141. Id. at 1900-01; see also supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text (discussing an
attorney's ethical and professional obligations within the context of a frivolous appeal, and the
reasons behind the obligations).
142. McCoy, 108 S. Ct. at 1901.
143. See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
144. McCoy, 108 S. Ct. at 1901-02 (citing Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963));
see also Penson v. Ohio, 109 S. Ct. 346, 351 (1988) (noting that the fourteenth amendment
does not demand that states require appointed appellate attorneys to press frivolous appeals);
Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 324 (1981) (noting that, as a matter of empirical fact,
appointed counsel may or may not disproportionately invoke the obligation to withdraw).
145. McCoy, 108 S. Ct. at 1904.
146. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967).
147. McCoy, 108 S. Ct. at 1904. But see supra notes 128-32 and accompanying text
(discussing the disparities in the relative positions of indigent defendants whose appointed
attorneys discuss frivolousness and nonindigent defendants whose retained attorneys make
ethical disclosures).
148. McCoy, 108 S. Ct. at 1902-04.
149. Id. at 1904.
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of his client. Thus the discussion requirement potentially may lead to
inadequate advocacy-inadequate advocacy that may also result in
the breakdown of adversarial proceedings and adversarial due
process. 150
The positions of indigents and nonindigents regarding the with-
drawal by counsel also differ considerably. Attorneys representing
nonindigents may withdraw as appellate counsel without leave of
court or the presentation of any conclusion or discussion that an
appeal is frivolous.1 5I On the other hand, attorneys representing indi-
gent defendants may not.'52 Although Anders did strike a balance by
requiring appellate counsel for indigents to report their conclusion of
frivolousness, 53 the balance may well be lost in cases in which
nonindigents are allowed preferential access to advocacy and indi-
gents are afforded only nominal representation-representation that
potentially opposes their interests. Justice Brennan's dissent in
McCoy acknowledged this inequity inherent in the discussion
requirement:
It by no means impugns the legal profession's integrity to acknowl-
edge that reasonable attorneys can differ as to whether a particular
issue is arguably meritorious.
Therein lies the Wisconsin rule's inequity. When retained
counsel in Wisconsin declines to appeal a case on the ground that
he believes the appeal to be frivolous, the wealthy client can always
seek a second opinion and might well find a lawyer who in good
conscience believes it to have arguable merit. In no event, however,
will any lawyer file in the wealthy client's name a brief that under-
cuts his position. In contrast, when appointed counsel harbors the
same belief, the indigent client has no recourse to a second opinion,
and (unless he withdraws his appeal) must respond in court to the
arguments of his own defender. An indigent defendant who
accepts the State's offer of counsel must submit to the state-
imposed risk that his counsel will advocate against him upon uni-
laterally concluding that the appeal is frivolous, but the defendant
with means to purchase a defender whose allegiance is undivided
need never fear such treachery. 1
54
The discussion requirement forces the indigent to choose among
undesirable options that include: (1) withdrawing the appeal for lack
of adequate attorney assistance; (2) withdrawing the appeal for lack of
ability and training to proceed pro se; (3) pursuing the appeal pro se
150. See supra notes 122-32 and accompanying text.
151. See McCoy, 108 S. Ct. at 1901.
152. Id.
153. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
154. McCoy, 108 S. Ct. at 1909 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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despite the lack of ability and training; or (4) pursuing the appeal with
the risk of losing effective advocacy and adversarial protections when
counsel concludes that the appeal is frivolous and supports his conclu-
sion with discussion. 55 The notable difference for nonindigent
defendants is that they have the resources to seek second opinions and
retain attorneys who, in good conscience, can argue their appeals. 56
Nonindigent defendants therefore will never contend with attorneys
who file briefs that undercut their positions. 57  The discussion
requirement's disparate treatment of indigent defendants is exacer-
bated when appointed counsel engages in discussion to such an extent
that he no longer acts as an active advocate, but acts instead as an
amicus curiae or prosecuting attorney.158 Overall, these differences
between the treatment of indigent and nonindigent defendants reveal
that indigent defendants' fourteenth amendment equal protection
guarantee to the assistance of appellate counsel may be lost in the
application of the Wisconsin Rule's discussion requirement.
V. THE IMPLICATIONS OF MCCOY AND ITS EFFECT ON
APPOINTED APPELLATE ADVOCACY
The Supreme Court's holding in McCoy that an appointed attor-
ney can be required to discuss the reasons why an appeal is frivolous
alters the purpose of the Anders brief that appointed counsel must
present to an appellate court. This change is evident in the McCoy
Court's statement that "[t]he Anders brief is not a substitute for an
advocate's brief on the merits," 59 but is instead meant to assist an
appellate court in evaluating the frivolousness of the appeal, as well as
in evaluating an appointed attorney's role as an advocate.' °
Although one of the purposes of the Anders brief is to assist the appel-
late court in evaluating the frivolousness of the appeal and counsel's
155. Id.
156. Id.; see also supra note 100 (suggesting that attorneys will welcome appeals by
nonindigents, but might not welcome the same appeals if brought by indigents).
157. McCoy, 108 S. Ct. at 1909 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Because the Wisconsin Rule only
requires appointed attorneys to discuss why an appeal lacks merit, it imposes the discussion
requirement only upon indigents. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 809.32(1) (West 1988).
158. McCoy, 108 S. Ct. at 1899-1900.
159. Id. at 1904. But see id. at 1909 n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (contesting the majority's
conclusion that an Anders brief is not a brief on the merits); supra note 112 (discussing the
problems associated with the McCoy Court's conclusion that No-Merit Briefs are not briefs on
the merits).
160. McCoy, 108 S. Ct. at 1903; see also supra notes 113 & 116-21 and accompanying text
(discussing the McCoy Court's view of the purposes of an Anders brief and how the discussion
requirement complied with the purposes behind the Anders brief and ethical and professional
obligations).
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role,'61 it also seeks to "afford the [client] that advocacy which a non-
indigent defendant is able to obtain."' 62 Thus the Anders brief was
designed not only to assist an appellate court in assuring that indi-
gents received adequate advocacy, but also to ensure such advocacy
by requiring references to anything in the record that might arguably
support the appeal.
Although it is true that the McCoy decision seeks to aid indigent
defendants, it attempts to do this only indirectly. By allowing the
discussion requirement, the Court claims that counsel may discover
errors in his conclusion that an appeal was frivolous. 163 This analysis,
however, fails to recognize that an appointed appellate counsel will
only submit a No-Merit Brief with the accompanying discussion if the
"fuller" evaluation that the Court believes will follow from the discus-
sion requirement proves unfavorable to the indigent defendant.
Therefore, if the discussion is presented, the indigent defendant will
receive no benefit because his attorney verified the correctness of his
conclusion that the appeal was frivolous. This goal of assisting
appointed appellate counsel to discover errors in their evaluations of
appeals might be better served by requiring them to evaluate fully the
prosecution's cases and by requiring them only to report their com-
pletion of a full evaluation of the appeal when filing the No-Merit
Briefs. 164
The McCoy Court implies that an appellate court can further aid
a defendant by correctly evaluating the frivolous conclusion through
the use of counsel's discussion. 65 This implication is misguided, how-
ever, because the discussion will support the conclusion that the
appeal is frivolous. The risks to advocacy, therefore, increase when
appointed counsel are placed in situations in which they, in effect,
may act in the role of amicus curiae or opposing counsel. 66 Further-
more, appellate courts that rely on the contents of the discussion may
hinder their independent review, thus causing further detriment to
indigent defendants' due process and equal protection rights to coun-
sel. '67 The McCoy Court's attempt to assure that indigents' constitu-
161. McCoy, 108 S. Ct. at 1902-03.
162. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 745 (1967). See supra notes 60-66 & 122 and
accompanying text.
163. McCoy, 108 S. Ct. at 1904.
164. See supra notes 130-33 and accompanying text. This report stating that counsel has
completed a full evaluation of the appeal is to be an additional protection beyond Anders'
requirement of references to anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal.
165. McCoy, 108 S. Ct. at 1903-04.
166. See supra notes 60, 70-77 & 123-25 and accompanying text.
167. The detriment that indigent defendants suffer becomes apparent when appointed
attorneys incorrectly conclude that an appeal is frivolous, and when appellate courts rely, or
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tional rights have not been violated therefore tends to pose great risks
that the same rights will be violated and that ineffective advocacy will
result.
The presentation of the "frivolous" conclusion and its associated
discussion is based on ethical and professional obligations to the
court. The underlying goal of the discussion requirement and its risks
to indigent defendants' right to counsel, however, may remain unsat-
isfied. This underlying goal-to avoid unduly overburdening the
courts and wasting the time and energies of the appellate courts and
the opposing parties168 -may suffer because the discussion of why an
appeal is frivolous may result in inactive advocacy and ineffective
assistance of counsel. 
169
The resulting problems of inactive advocacy and ineffective
assistance of counsel will lead indigent defendants to pursue addi-
tional remedies beyond their original appeals. Through remedies such
as habeas corpus, the disposition of appeals can be challenged based
on the extent to which counsel may have engaged in the discussion of
frivolousness. Furthermore, the courts themselves may impose vary-
ing degrees of discussion upon appointed counsel, and this imposed
discussion may itself require review in particular cases. The resulting
problem is similar to one that concerned Justice Rehnquist when he
wrote in another case about a "result ... akin to the effect created
when a mirror is held facing another mirror, the image repeating itself
to infinity."17
Several states have responded to the problem of wasted time and
resources caused by withdrawing from appeals, and they have decided
that advocacy and economy are better served if counsel is not permit-
are influenced by, such unilateral conclusions. See Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL,
BASIC CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 176 (6th ed. 1986) (" 'Several judges have reported to us the
disheartening experience of reversing convictions after appointed counsel has filed an 'Anders'
brief explaining that his client's cause was entirely hopeless.' ") (quoting P. CARRINGTON, D.
MEADOR & M. ROSENBERG, JUSTICE ON APPEAL 77 (1976)); see also supra note 137 and
accompanying text (asserting that an appellate court can determine independently whether an
appeal is frivolous with minimal independent research).
168. See McCoy, 108 S. Ct. at 1900; Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 323 (1981) (A
lawyer is obligated not to burden the courts with frivolous motions or appeals.).
169. See supra notes 60, 70-77 & 123-25 and accompanying text.
170. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 411 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (evaluating the
burden on the court system that claims of ineffective representation would occasion). Due to
the possibility of varying degrees of discussion, the type of problem Justice Rehnquist was
concerned with becomes more apparent and more complicated, especially because Anders
violations are not subject to prejudice or harmless error analysis. See Penson v. Ohio, 109 S.
Ct. 346, 353 (1988) (holding that Strickland prejudice analysis and harmless error analysis are
inapplicable to Anders briefs).
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ted to withdraw from an appeal."' The need for an Anders brief is
negated in such states. These states have concluded that appeals
should be fully adjudicated, without spending time evaluating
whether counsel was correct in assessing the frivolousness of an
appeal. 172 Although the judgement of these states need not be fol-
lowed, as indeed Anders allowed the contrary position, the reasons
that led those states not to consider the issue of the frivolous nature of
appeals are amplified when the effectiveness of advocacy is reviewable
ad infinitum and the extent to which counsel engaged in discussion is
questioned.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although the narrow holding of McCoy is that states can require
appointed counsel to discuss why appeals are frivolous, a broader
interpretation may also allow attorneys to engage in that discussion-
and judges personally to require the discussion-in states where the
requirement has not been established. This Note illustrates the dan-
gers to the sixth and fourteenth amendment rights of indigent defend-
ants to receive effective advocacy and adversarial testing of a case
when their appellate counsel discusses why an appeal is frivolous.
The extent to which such a discussion could take place without
appointed counsel crossing the line that separates a partisan advocate
from an amicus curiae seems narrow indeed. Determining where to
draw the line is unique to every case and thus seems to require case-
by-case review. Because of the waste of time and resources that the
discussion device creates and the risks it poses to constitutional rights,
the discussion requirement should be used sparingly and in a limited
fashion, if at all.
EDUARDO I. SANCHEZ
171. See, e.g., State v. McKenney, 98 Idaho 551, 568 P.2d 1213 (1977) (prohibiting
appointed appellate attorneys from withdrawing from appeals in order to conserve time and to
provide a higher constitutional safeguard); State v. Gates, 466 S.W.2d 681 (Mo. 1971)
(prohibiting appointed appellate attorneys from withdrawing from appeals that they believe
are frivolous in order to provide a safeguard against lowered advocacy and to avoid
duplication of efforts where the appellate court would have to independently review the
record); see generally Mendelson, Frivolous Criminal Appeals: The Anders Brief or the Idaho
Rule? 19 CRIM. L. BULL. 22 (1983) (critiquing the Anders procedure that allows counsel to
withdraw, and favoring a requirement that counsel remain on the case); Pengilly, supra note
130 (discussing the ethical conflicts presented in the context of frivolous appeals and
approaches that various jurisdictions have taken).
172. See supra note 171.
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